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PARENS PATRIAE ACTION UNDER SECTION
FOUR OF TBE CLAYTON ACT
For the first time in history, the courts have been called upon to
decide whether a state, acting in its capacity as parens patriae, may
maintain a treble damage action under section 4 of the Clayton Act'
for injuries to its general economy. In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,2
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit answered
this question in the negative. While the holding is narrowly restricted
to an interpretation of the treble damage provision in the Clayton Act,
the case nevertheless raises broader questions. Today there exist
businesses, industries and interest groups of unprecedented magnitude,
with power to threaten and damage not only individuals, but com-
munities or entire regions as well. The damage may result from anti-
trust violations that thwart the development of a state's economy, from
dumping of refuse and byproducts that contaminate its natural en-
vironment or from other activities yet to be imagined. Often the
state rather than the individual citizen will be the more appropriate
and practical party to redress these infringements. The larger question
raised by the Hawaii case is this: will the states be limited to their
traditional injunctive remedies against injuries to the general economy,
or can they develop theories upon which to recover money damages as
well?
The Hawaii case is an action brought by the state against three
oil companies and a subsidiary to recover damages for price-fixing,
monopolization and various other violations of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.3 Count II of the complaint alleged damage to the "gen-
eral economy" suffered by Hawaii in her capacity as parens patriae,
trustee, guardian and protector of her citizens. The Ninth Circuit
took a firm and restrictive stand when it reversed an order of the dis-
trict court denying the defendants' motion to dismiss count II. Con-
sidering the importance of the underlying issue involved in Hawaii,
and considering the adverse effect the Ninth Circuit's decision might
have upon future development of the parens patriae action, a detailed
analysis and criticism of the decision is clearly warranted.
Background-Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.
Before analyzing the Hawaii case, it is helpful to look briefly at
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
2. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted,
91 S. Ct. 931 (1971) (No. 1060).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964).
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R.,4 a 1945 Supreme Court case factually
similar to Hawaii and upon which the district court relied heavily in
denying the defendant's motion to dismiss Hawaii's parens patriae
count. In Georgia the state instituted an action in federal district court,
then moved for leave to file a bill of complaint invoking the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The complaint alleged a conspiracy
in restraint of trade among the defendant railroads to fix and maintain
freight rates in the State of Georgia. Because rates charged by the de-
fendants in other parts of the United States were substantially lower
than those charged in Georgia, Georgia complained that rates fixed pur-
suant to the conspiracy resulted in the following injuries: (a) Georgia's
products had been denied access to national markets on an equal basis
with those of other states; (b) Georgia's economy had been limited
to staple agricultural products, opportunity in manufacturing had been
limited, and the state had been prevented from achieving full and com-.
plete utilization of its natural wealth; (c) the state's measures to pro-
mote a well-rounded agricultural program had been frustrated; and (d)
Georgia's economy had been held in a state of arrested development.5
Georgia sued in four capacities, two of which were discussed in
the Supreme Court's opinion: (1) her capacity as quasi-sovereign
(parens patriae) or trustee, guardian and protector of her people, and
(2) her capacity as proprietor of a railroad and other state-owned
institutions. The bill included a prayer for both injunctive relief and
damages.
The Supreme Court granted the amended bill of complaint,
thereby allowing Georgia to assert both claims-her claim as proprietor
as well as her claim as parens patriae. The court recognized that a
state may not only bring an antitrust suit to protect its obvious inter-
est in state-owned properties, but also may protect the health and
comfort of its citizens. 6 These "quasi-sovereign" interests in the gen-,
eral welfare of the state are not merely an accumulation of all the indi-
vidual citizen's private interests, the Court held, but rather are "inde-
pendent of and behind the titles of its citizens. . .. ,,7 In bringing
a parens patriae action, a state is not acting solely for the benefit of the
citizens in protecting their individual rights, but is protecting a matter
of state interest independent of any interest which the private citizens
may have.
The difference between the separate and distinct interests of a
state as parens patriae and the interests of individual citizens of a state
4. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
5. Id. at 444.
6. Id. at 448, citing Missouri v. Illinois, 108 U.S. 208, 241 (1944).
7. Id. at 448, quoting Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237
(1907).
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was emphasized in Oklahoma v. Cook.8 There an Oklahoma statute
provided that a bank's shareholders shall be liable to depositors and
creditors in proportion to the amount of stock owned and authorized
the Bank Commissioner to enforce this statutory obligation. The stat-
ute further provided that the State of Oklahoma shall own the assets
of failed banks in trust for the benefit of the depositors and creditors
of the bank. The state brought an action to enforce Cook's duty as
shareholder under the statute, but the Supreme Court refused to take
original jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that it is not enough "that
a State has acquired the legal title to a cause of action against the de-
fendant"; and that "[W]e must look beyond the mere legal title of the
complaining State to the cause of action asserted and to the nature
of the State's interest."9 Although Oklahoma had legal title to these
rights and claimed that their enforcement was a matter of state policy,
in reality the rights asserted were for the benefit of the individual citi-
zens (creditors and depositors). These individuals were the real par-
ties in interest. Therefore, Oklahoma did not have a separate and in-
dependent interest in the enforcement of these rights sufficient to enable
her to maintain a parens patriae action.
In Georgia, by contrast, the Supreme Court concluded that since
the economy of Georgia had suffered damage as a result of the alleged
conspiracy, therefore the state itself, which has an independent interest
in its economy, may properly maintain an action in its capacity as
parens patriae to protect this "quasi-sovereign" interest:
Georgia as a representative of the public is complaining of a wrong
which, if proven, limits the opportunities of her people, shackles
her industries, retards her development, and relegates her to an in-
ferior economic position among her sister States. These are mat-
ters of grave public concern in which Georgia has an interest apart
from that of particular individuals who may be affected. 10
While the Court held the complaint sufficient to state a cause of
action for an injunction, it disposed of the prayer for damages on the
authority of Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.11 In Keogh a manufacturer
of excelsior alleged that eight defendant railroad companies and others
had eliminated competition in interstate freight hauling by conspiring
to establish uniform rates. The rates had been approved by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. The Supreme Court held that while such
approval by the commission would not bar an action by the Govern-
ment to enforce the Sherman Act, it does bar a private action for
damages. Any rate ratified by the commission, the Court reasoned, is
the legal rate as between shipper and carrier. Since the rates fixed by
8. Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 392 (1938).
9. Id. at 393.
10. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 451 (1945).
11. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
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the defendants in Georgia had likewise been approved by the commis-
sion, the Keogh rule applied with equal force in Georgia.'"
Because the Keogh rule foreclosed Georgia's claim for damages, the
Court was able to sidestep the -question whether, absent approval of
the fixed rates by an administrative agency having primary jurisdiction,
Georgia would have been able to maintain its parens patriae action for
damages. In view of the many factual similarities between the Georgia
case and the Hawaii case, the parties in Hawaii naturally indulged
in considerable speculation as to what the Supreme Court would have
done with Georgia's prayer for damages had it not relied on Keogh.
In Georgia, the Supreme Court unequivocally upheld a state's right to
bring an action in its parens patriae capacity under the antitrust acts.
The Court did not specifically limit its approval to actions for in-
junctive relief.
It therefore remains an open question whether some of the language
in Georgia lends support to a state's right to bring a parens patriae
action for damages as well. After all, this is the interpretation the
district court in Hawaii gave it.'3  The court of appeals rejected this
interpretation, reasoning that the Georgia holding applies only to suits
for injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act.
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.
In Hawaii the Ninth Circuit was compelled to decide the question
which the Supreme Court managed to sidestep in the Georgia case:
Can a state recover damages to its general economy in a private anti-
trust action under section 4 of the Clayton Act? The State of Hawaii
alleged that the four defendants-three oil companies and a subsid-
iary-conspired to fix and maintain prices on motor gasoline and as-
phalt in the Hawaii market. Count I of the complaint alleged that
the state suffered losses in its proprietary capacity. The Ninth Circuit
was concerned only with count II, which alleged:
The State of Hawaii . . .brings this action by virtue of its duty
to protect the general welfare of the State and its citizens, acting
herein as parens patriae, trustee, guardian and representative of
its citizens to recover damages for, and secure injunctive relief
against, the violations of the antitrust laws hereinbefore alleged.' 4
12. In Hawaii the Keogh rule is not applicable since the alleged conspiracy
does not involve rates fixed by any commission.
13. "The Supreme Court held Georgia had properly asserted a cause of action for
injunctive and damage relief as parens patriae as well as proprietor. . . ." Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 301-F. Supp. 982, 984 (D. Hawaii 1969). The district court goes
all the way-in its interpretation-of the language in Georgia, considering Georgia to
have recognized a state's right to bring an action for damage as parens patriae ignor-
ing the language's status as dictum.
14. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282, 1283 (9th Cir. 1970).
The complaint particularized the injuries suffered by the economy of
Hawaii as a result of the defendant's alleged unlawful activity:
(a) revenues of its citizens have been wrongfully extracted from
[the economy of] the State of Hawaii;
(b) taxes affecting the citizens and commercial entities have been
increased to [offset] such losses of revenues and income;
(c) opportunity in manufacturing, shipping and commerce have [sic]
been restricted and curtailed;
(d) the full and complete utilization of the natural wealth of the
State has been prevented;
(e) the high cost of manufacture in Hawaii has precluded goods
made there from equal competititve access with those of other States
to the national market;
(f) measures taken by the State to promote the general progress
and welfare of its people have been frustrated;
(g) the Hawaii economy has been held in a state of arrested de-
velopment.15
The defendants moved to dismiss the parens patriae count for fail-
ure to state a claim. The district court denied the motion. The case
then came before the Ninth Circuit on an interlocutory appeal.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and distinguished the Georgia case on
the ground that its language authorizing private antitrust suits by a state
in its parens patriae capacity applies only to suits for injunctive relief
under section 16 of the Clayton Act. The court set forth two separate
grounds for its decision: First, that injury to a state's economy is not
injury to "business or property" within the meaning of section 4 of the
Clayton Act; and second, that the damages alleged in the parens
patriae count were too remote and indirect to give Hawaii standing to
sue.
The Parens Patriae Action
Hawaii's claim was not a claim asserted on behalf of the citizens
of the state to recover the accumulated damage directly suffered by
them as individuals.'6 This would constitute a representative or "class
action," "an action brought in behalf of other persons similarly situ-
ated."'" Rather, Hawaii's claim was asserted in its own capacity as
parens patriae. It was predicated on an interest in the economy of the
state, an interest existing independently of the interests of individual
citizens of Hawaii.
15. Id. at 1283 n.2.
16. Hawaii's class action claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
count III of the complaint, was dismissed by the district court in Hawaii and no
appeal has been taken from that order.
17. Mitchell v. Wright, 62 F. Supp. 580, 582 (M.D. Ala. 1945), rev'd on other
grounds, 154 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1946).
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The parens patriae action orignated as a prerogative power of the
King of England and was inherited by America as part of the common
law. When this country separated from England, certain prerogatives
of the crown vested, it is said, in the people of the states. "The
State, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae."''  One of these preroga-
tives was the power to protect persons non sui juris, such as minors, in-
sane and incompetent persons. While originally this sovereign power
of guardianship was exercised to protect persons non sui juris, the
courts have not limited the power of the state to these particular cir-
cumstances. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that parens
patriae actions will lie for protection against pouring of sewage into a
state's river,19 drainage of surface water into a state,20 withdrawal of
natural gas from the established current of commerce 2 1 or discharge
of noxious fumes over the territory of a state.22  It would seem,
therefore, that a state may bring a parens patriae action both to protect
persons who would otherwise have no rightful protector and to preserve
the general welfare of the state.
The Parens Patriae Action in Hawaii
In Hawaii the district court undertook to delineate the require-
ments a state must satisfy before it can maintain an action in its parens
patriae capacity. First it must show some interest "independent of and
behind the titles of its citizens. '23  That is to say, the interests to be
vindicated must be something other than the sum total of the interests
of individual citizens of the state.24 Moreover, an action brought
merely to protect the state's proprietary interests does not qualify as
parens patriae action. Second, a state may not sue in its parens
patriae capacity where only a small portion of its citizens are adversely
affected by the acts of the defendants.25
When these principles are applied to the Hawaii case, the alleged in-
jury to the economy of Hawaii appears to meet the requirements for a
proper parens patriae action. A state's independent interest in the
economy-an interest over and above the interests of the citizens-has
18. Wheeler v. Smith, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 55, 78 (1850).
19. Missouri v. Elinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1910).
20. E.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Kansas v. Colorado,
185 U.S. 125 (1902) (water diverted from a state).
21. E.g., Ohio v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
22. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
23. Id. at 237; accord, e.g., Oklahoma ex reL Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387
(1938); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900).
24. E.g., Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900).
25. Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 160 F. Supp.
387 (E.D. La. 1958).
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been explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court.26 Likewise, every
citizen of a state is affected, either directly or indirectly, by injuries to
the state's economy.
Although the Ninth Circuit's decision did not rest on this ground,
it should be noted that the court questioned the appropriateness of the
parens patriae action to protect against harm to the economy. Voicing
skepticism as to the possibility of independent harm to the general
economy, the court expressed the view that "[The economy] has no
value in itself, save as it may (in a representational capacity on behalf
of business and property generally) serve to confer value on the specific
items of business or property it affects,' 27 and that "[t]he general
economy is an abstraction. '2'  Apparently the court considers that
the "economy" exists only in the mind, is not part of reality and is
therefore incapable of being damaged. On this issue the Ninth Circuit
seems to have parted company with the Supreme Court. That the gen-
eral economy may suffer independent harm and that such harm is the
proper subject matter for a parens patriae action was long ago decided
in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R.29
Hawaii's parens patriae count was also attacked on the general
ground that such an action will not lie to recover money damages.
"We know of no case from the Judiciary Act of 1789 to the present
time", the appellants asserted, "in which a State has been permitted to
recover damages in such an action. ' 30  But this point, even if assumed
to be true, is not really dispositive of the question whether a state may
recover money damages in a parens patriae action. For there is like-
wise no case on record in which such recovery has been denied. The
only reasonable conclusion, it would seem, is that the courts have never
squarely confronted this precise question, and that consequently the
question remains open.
The Ninth Circuit's Holding in Hawaii
Section 4 of the Clayton Act is the general statutory provision for
recovery of treble damages in private antitrust actions. It reads as fol-
lows:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue there-
26. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
27. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 431 F.2d 1282, 1285 (9th Cir.
1970).
28. Id.
29. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
30. Brief for Appellant at 18-19, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., No. 24,603 (9th
Cir., Sept. 25, 1970).
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for in any district court of the United States. . . and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained.31
The lower federal courts have consistently construed section 4
quite narrowly, thereby foreclosing claims which would otherwise seem
to fall within the purview of the statute. One way of narrowing the
application of the statute is to impose judicial restrictions upon its so-
called "standing" requirement. Another way is to construe the words
"business or property" strictly and to deny recovery on the ground
that the plaintiff's injury does not fall within the category of injuries
which the court considers "injuries to business or property" within
the meaning of the statute. In Hawaii the court rested its holding upon
both of these "closely related" grounds-lack of standing and absence
of injury to "business or property". Actually the case law has not
always carefully distinguished between the two grounds when denying
a plaintiff recovery. This is understandable since the standing ques-
tion-that is, the question whether a plaintiff has a substantive, le-
gally protected interest-may depend upon whether the particular
plaintiff alleges injury to business or property within the meaning of
the statute. Manifestly, therefore, the two grounds are interrelated and
in part interdependent. In the discussion to follow, the two grounds
for the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hawaii will be taken up separately.
A. Standing
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides: "Any person who shall
be injured in his business or property [may sue]."3 Assuming for the
moment the injury alleged does constitute injury to business or prop-
erty, the language ostensibly sets up a broad and all-inclusive standard
by which to determine standing: "Any person who shall be injured
[may sue]."13 3 The lower federal courts are markedly indisposed to
construe the statute with the sweeping breadth which its literal word-
ing seems to invite; they have in effect superimposed judicial restric-
tions on the standing requirements of section 4. In Hawaii the Ninth
Circuit relied upon one of these judicial restrictions in barring Hawaii's
parens patriae claim.
While the federal courts exercise discretion in imposing standing re-
quirements which limit the inclusiveness of section 4, they are not in ac-
cord as to the particular test to be applied. Under one test, enunciated
in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 4 a private antitrust plaintiff has stand-
31. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910), discussed in Comment, Standing to Sue for
Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLum. L. REv. 570, 581-82
(1964).
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ing to sue only if his alleged injuries are "direct." In practice, this
"directness" concept has been used to exclude such would-be plaintiffs
as creditors,35 employees,3 6 shareholders37 and patent owners suing
for loss of royalties.38 Another test, first propounded by the Ninth
Circuit in Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc.,39 requires that
the plaintiff, in order to have standing, must fall within the "target
area 0 of the violator:
One who is only incidentally injured by a violation of the antitrust
laws-the bystander who was hit but not aimed at-cannot recover
against the violator.41
1. The Target-Area Test
In Conference an association of labor unions and individual union
members brought an antitrust action alleging a conspiracy among the
defendants, a group of "major" film producers and another labor
union. The gist of the alleged conspiracy was that the major film pro-
ducers agreed to hire only members of the defendant union, and the
union agreed, in turn, to furnish their most skilled members to the de-
fendant film producers and to supply employees to the other film pro-
ducers only at higher rates. Plaintiffs alleged that the purpose of the con-
spiracy was to destroy both the independent producers and the plain-
tiff union, whose members would be out of work once their employers-
the independent producers-went out of business. The district court
entered a judgment on the pleadings for the defendants and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. The court's reasoning, was that the conspiracy to re-
strain competition was directed at "minor" film producers, and the
35. See, e.g., Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, 36 F.2d 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). The
court refused to allow plaintiff as creditor of a corporation to recover for damages
allegedly suffered by the corporation as a result of an illegal restraint of trade by
the defendants.
36. See, e.g., Centanni v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La.),
aff'd, 323 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1963). The employees of a corporate plaintiff were
denied recovery having not suffered directly as a result of the alleged conspiracy by
the defendants. But see, e.g., McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F.
Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1948); Roseland v. Phisler Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir.
1942).
37. E.g., Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958);
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910). See text accompanying notes
47-48 infra.
38. Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956). See text accompanying note 49 in ra.
39. 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
40. Although the test itself originated in Conference, this phrase by which it
has come to be known was first used in Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Co., 221 F.2d
358 (9th Cir. 1955).
41. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 363 (9th Cir. 1955).
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damage suffered by the plaintiff was merely incidental.42
The Ninth Circuit considerably broadened the "target area" test in
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn.43  Goldwyn, a motion
picture producer, brought an action alleging a price-fixing combina-
tion among the defendant motion picture exhibitors and their agents
which resulted in depreciation of the value of the plaintiff's pictures,
reduction of fees paid to the plaintiff under licenses and a detrimental
effect upon the goodwill of the plaintiffs business. Here the Ninth
Circuit made it clear that "to be aimed at" did not require that the
purpose of the conspiracy be to injure the particular plaintiff. It
only meant that plaintiffs affected operation be "in the area which it
could reasonably be foreseen would be affected by the conspiracy.
44
Applying this "reasonable foreseeability" test to the facts of Con-
ference, where the "target area" test originated, one would likely ar-
rive at the opposite conclusion from the one actually reached in that
case; this difference in result indicates a shift in the application of the
test. In Conference, it will be recalled, a plaintiff labor union was held
not to have standing to sue another labor union and a number of mo-
tion picture producers who allegedly combined to drive out the "inde-
pendent" producers who were the employers of the plaintiff union's
members. It would seem to be "reasonably foreseeable" that the em-
ployees of a company which was driven out of business as a result of
an unlawful conspiracy would be affected by the conspiracy.
What test did the Ninth Circuit apply in Hawaii in order to deter-
mine that the plaintiff lacked standing? Although the Ninth Circuit
gave the "target area" test token approval by citing Karseal Corp. v.
Richfield Oil Corp.,4" the "directness" test was actually applied. All
the remaining authority cited consisted of prior cases applying the "di-
rectness" test. Moreover, the court's language leaves little room for
doubt that the directness test was being used: "[O]ne whose injury is an
incidental or remote consequence of defendant's violation may not re-
cover under the Clayton Act."'48 It is not surprising that the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Hawaii declined to rely solely on the "target area" test it first de-
vised. Since that test has metamorphosed into a mere reasonable fore-
seeability test, it has lost much of its usefulness as a judicial limitation on
standing in antitrust cases. Clearly it is difficult to say that injury to the
general economy of Hawaii was not a reasonably foreseeable conse-
quence of the defendant oil companies' alleged antitrust violations.
42. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir.
1951).
43. 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964).
44. Id. at 220.
45. 221 F.2d 358, 363 (9th Cir. 1955).
46. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282, 1285 (9th Cir. 1970).
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2. The Directness Test
A careful analysis will show that the "directness" test is equally
inappropriate to bar Hawaii's claim. In support of its conclusion that
the alleged injuries to Hawaii's general economy are too remote, the
Ninth Circuit cited a case where a corporate shareholder was held to be
too remote to sue for treble damages under the Clayton Act,47 a case
where creditor's claims were too remote48 and a case where patent
owners suing for loss of license royalties were held to be inappropriate
parties to bring an action. 49 It is unquestionable that in each of these
cases the defendant's alleged antitrust violations had injured some third
party more directly than they had injured the would-be plaintiff.
In Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc.,50 the administrator
of the estate of a deceased majority shareholder in a theater corporation
alleged that the defendants had cut off the corporation's supply of films,
as a result of which it was forced out of business. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Although a shareholder of a
corporation injured by an antitrust conspiracy might be thought to
have a claim different from any claim assertable by the corporation,
the court remarked that "this has not been the course of the deci-
sions."'" The corporation was more directly harmed and is the
proper party to bring suit. The shareholder must rest content with
such increase in the value of his shares as results from any recovery by
the corporation.
Again, in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.,52 the corporation was
held to be the appropriate party to bring the action. Plaintiff was a
shareholder, creditor and employee of the Liberty Photo Supply Com-
pany, which had been forced into bankruptcy as a result of the alleged
monopolistic activities of the defendant. The shareholder of a corpo-
ration would not have had a direct remedy against the defendant even
in the pre-Sherman Act period, and the court held that the act should
not be construed to contravene this established policy of the common
law. To hold otherwise, the court pointed out, would give the plain-
tiff-creditors an advantage over non-plaintiff creditors.
In Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Products Corp.,53 the
plaintiff had granted an exclusive license on certain patents to the An-
47. Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958).
48. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
49. Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1957).
50. 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958).
51. Id. at 295.
52. 183 F. 704 (2d Cir. 1910).
53. 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956).
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dersen Company. The plaintiff complained that his royalties on these
patents had been reduced as a result of defendant's selling its products
upon the condition that purchasers do not deal with the Andersen Com-
pany. Again the court considered the plaintiffs interest too remote
since the licensee was the party who was directly injured. In Pro-
ductive Inventions, as in Bookout and Loeb, the plaintiff's interest was
patently subordinate to and less substantial than another's more direct
interest.
In Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's Inc.54 the plaintiff was the
owner of a motion picture theater. One of the defendants, the les-
see-operator of the theater, paid as part of his rent a percentage of ad-
mission fees. The plaintiff alleged that the lessee had conspired in
violation of the antitrust laws to show third-run pictures in the theater
and that lower admission fees and lower rent resulted. Following the
rule of Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,55 the court held that
the non-operating lessor-owner of a motion picture theater whose rental
interest is based upon a percentage of the receipts was not entitled to
recover. Likening a theater owner's interest in a percentage contract
to Hawaii's interest in its general economy, as the Ninth Circuit did, is
stretching an analogy to the extremities of reason. One federal district
court has refused to follow the Melrose case in an almost identical fact
situation.5"
The foregoing cases show that the "directness" rule has been ap-
plied to exclude a plaintiff's claim in cases where there is another po-
tential plaintiff-the corporation in Bookout and Loeb, for example,
or the licensee in Productive Inventions-who has suffered more imme-
diate harm and who is therefore deemed a more appropriate party to
bring suit. In Hawaii, by contrast, the plaintiff state brought an ac-
tion in its capacity as parens patriae to recover damages to its general
economy. To maintain a parens patriae action an interest independ-
ent and separate from the interests of the citizens is a prerequisite.
Therefore, assuming the existence of a state's separate and independ-
ent interest in its general economy, 57 it is difficult to say that the in-
terest is too remote since no party other than the state itself could con-
ceivably protect such an interest.
Over 25 years ago the Supreme Court held in Georgia v. Penn-
sylvania R.R.58 that
54. 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956).
55. 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
56. Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir 1957). See
text accompanying note 77 infra.
57. The Georgia case appears to have decided that issue. See text accompany-
ing note 10 supra.
58. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
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Georgia has in interest [in its economy] apart from that of particu-
lar individuals who may be affected. Georgia's interest is not re-
mote; it is immediate.5 9
No court has ever indicated that the standing requirements applied in
injunction suits differ from those to be applied in damage actions.
Therefore, the Georgia case should have put to rest any questions
concerning Hawaii's standing to sue.
Injury to Business or Property Within the Meaning of
Section 4 of the Clayton Act
As a second ground for its decision in Hawaii, the Ninth Circuit
held that as a matter of law "injury to the general economy of a State
is not an injury to the business or property of the State or its peo-
ple."6  No court has ever before expressly decided this precise ques-
tion. In Georgia, the Supreme Court allowed Georgia's parens patriae
action; but after the damage issue was dropped, Georgia merely sought
injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act.6 ' In Hawaii,
the Ninth Circuit tried to distinguish Georgia by pointing to an assert-
edly crucial difference in wording between section 16, which enables
private plaintiffs to sue for injunctive relief against "threatened loss or
damage" resulting from antitrust violations, and section 4, which pro-
vides for recovery of treble damages for injury to a plaintiff's "business
or property." The Ninth Circuit determined that the former section
is "far broader" than the latter.62 Therefore, the court concluded,
Hawaii's general economy may suffer "loss or damage" within the mean-
ing of section 16 of the Clayton Act, but such loss or damage does
not necessarily constitute injury to "business or property" within the
meaning of section 4.
The court cited no authority-no legislative history and no prior
59. Id. at 451.
60. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282, 1285 (9th Cir. 1970) (emphasis
added).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
62. 431 F.2d 1282, 1284 (9th Cir. 1970). Section 15 reads as follows: "Any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States
in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without re-
spect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1964). Section 26 provides in part: "Any person, firm, corporation, or
association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the
United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by
a violation of the antitrust laws .. .when and under the same conditions and princi-
ples as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is
granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings ....... Id.
§ 26.
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decisions-in support of its conclusion that the phrase "loss or damage"
is "far broader" than the phrase "injury to business or property."
Hawaii appears to be the first decision to attribute any special legal
significance to this semantic difference. Other decisions have pointed
to a contrary conclusion: That the antitrust plaintiff suing for injunctive
relief under section 16 must satisfy the same "standing" requirements
as the plaintiff in a section 4 damage action;6" and that loss or damage
under section 16 means substantially the same thing as injury to busi-
ness or property under section 4.64 These propositions, if correct,
are fatal to the Ninth Circuit's attempted distinction between Hawaii
and Georgia, where a state bringing an antitrust suit in its parens
patriae capacity was held to have satisfied the requirements of section
16.
1. Injury to "Business"
To buttress its holding that injury to Hawaii's general economy is
not injury to the state's "business or property" within the meaning of
section 4, the court cited to a recognized body of law on the issue.
There is ample authority to the effect that the phrase "business or
property" in section 4 is used in its ordinary sense and denotes a com-
mercial venture or enterprise.6 5
Many of the cases construing the "business or property" language
of section 4 involve situations where a plaintiff alleges he has been pre-
vented from starting a business by the defendant's antitrust violations.
These cases, in other words, usually deal with the recoverability of an-
ticipated earnings from a prospective business. 66  A typical example is
63. Ash v. International Business Machs., Inc., 236 F. Supp. 218, 221 (E.D.
Pa. 1964), aff'd, 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966);
Data Digests, Inc. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 43 F.R.D. 386, 387 .7 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
64. Tivoli Realty, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del.
1948): "Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person 'injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws' may sue therefore
[sic] and shall recover threefold the damages sustained by him. Section 16 of the
Clayton Act provides for equitable relief in the form of an injunction for any person
upon substantially the same conditions." (emphasis added).
"It is well settled that a person suing under either of the two cited sections cannot
have relief unless he pleads and proves a pecuniary loss or injury to his business or
property." Id. at 805 (emphasis added).
65. E.g., Broadcasters, Inc. v. Morristown Broadcasting Corp., 185 F. Supp. 641,
644 (D.N.J. 1960); Image & Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp.
231, 233 (D. Mass. 1961); Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of
Domages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
231,233 (1962).
66. See, e.g., Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 991 (1966); Broadcasters, Inc. v. Morristown Broadcasting Corp.,
185 F. Supp. 641 (D.N.J. 1960).
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Duff v. Kansas City Star Co.," cited by the Ninth Circuit in Hawaii,
where the plaintiff, a one-time newspaper publisher in Kansas City,
ceased publishing his weekly paper for 8 years due to the war. Upon
returning to Kansas City, he made arrangements to recommence pub-
lishing, but he was prevented from doing so due to alleged monopoliza-
tion of the market by defendant, the publisher of the Kansas City Star.
The court held that plaintiff could not recover the anticipated earnings
of his prospective business.
The courts conclude that some line must be drawn in order to
forestall a deluge of spurious claims by plaintiffs alleging they have been
prevented from entering a business. When dealing with claims of this
sort, therefore, the courts have consistently construed "business or
property" strictly.
The "prospective business" cases yield a variety of tests for deter-
mining what constitutes injury to business or property within the mean-
ing of section 4.68 One test is whether the plaintiff has sufficient back-
ground and experience in the particular prospective business to justify a
finding that but for the defendant's illegal conduct, he would in fact
have entered the business." Another test is whether the plaintiff has
taken any affirmative steps toward entering the business, 0 or whether
he has signed any contracts with that end in view. 7' Still another test
is whether the plaintiff has sufficient ability to finance his proposed
venture. 72  Clearly these tests have relevance only in cases dealing
with business ventures in the strict sense. They are totally inapplicable
to the vastly different facts of the Hawaii case.
2. Injury to "Property"
Hawaii alleged damage to its general economy and sought redress
for an injury suffered in its parens patriae capacity. In the language
of section 4, Hawaii's interest in its general economy would seem more
akin to a "property" interest than to a "business" interest. The courts
have not generally distinguished between business and property al-
though, as the foregoing discussion suggests, the primary emphasis has
been on the business aspect of the statute.
67. 299 F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1962).
68. A list of guidelines is found in Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F.
Supp. 72, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
69. Peller v. International Boxing Club, 227 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1955).
70. See Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 166
F. 254 (2d Cir. 1908).
71. E.g., North Texas Producers Ass'n v. Young, 308 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 929 (1963).
72. E.g., Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 991 (1966).
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A New York federal district court has, however, drawn attention
to the fact that "[t]he statute explicitly uses the words 'business or
property' in the disjunctive. '7 3  It asserted that "[1less is required to
prove 'property' than to prove 'business.' ,,74 The reason why the
majority of the courts have not referred to this distinction, it has been
suggested, is that the distinction has seldom been in issue.7 5  In
Waldron v. British Petroleum Co.,"6 plaintiff had negotiated a contract
with an Iranian Oil Company under which plaintiff was given a right to
act as a principal in importing and selling oil. The plaintiff claimed
that the defendants' conspiracy prevented him from securing domestic
purchasers before his rights expired under the contract. The district
court held that the plaintiff's contract right was a sufficient "property"
interest within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act, even
though such a right would not qualify as a "business" interest.
When the courts determine what constitutes "property" within the
meaning of section 4, their language has tended to be less restrictive
than when they construe the term "business." In Congress Building
Corp. v. Loew's Inc.77 the court held that a lessor's reversionary in-
terest and right to a percentage of the lessee's gross receipts were suf-
ficient property interests to bring plaintiff within the purview of sec-
tion 4.78 The court stated that a plaintiff is injured in his property
whenever his property is diminished: "To the extent that the value
of any of these rights is diminished, the lessor is injured. ' 79  As the dis-
trict court held in Waldron,
[i]f it be decided that the rights privileges and powers possessed
by plaintiff should receive judicial sanction, that conclusion would
be expressed by declaring that plaintiff possessed "property. 's0
Similarly, in Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,8' the court said that
"whether appellant has property within the meaning of the statute
73. Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has made the same distinction. Martin
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629, 634 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 991
(1966).
74. 231 F. Supp. at 86.
75. Id.
76. 231 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
77. 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957).
78. The Seventh Circuit has refused to follow Harrison v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954). Melrose Realty Co.
v. Loew's Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956), relies on
the Harrison doctrine and is therefore contra to the Congress case.
79. Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587, 594 (7th Cir. 1957)
(emphasis added).
80. Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
81. 365 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 991 (1966).
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would appear to depend on whether what he possessed was deserving
of legal protection." 2
The statute clearly provides that an antitrust plaintiff can recover
treble damages only for injury to his business or property. But it is left
up to the courts to determine exactly what constitutes "business" or
"property." The term "property," as used in section 4, has come to
mean any legal interest which the court deems deserving of judicial
protection. Thus when the Ninth Circuit decided that Hawaii does not
have a "property" interest in its general economy, this meant in essence
that Hawaii's recognized rights, privileges and powers in regard to its
general economy do not deserve judicial protection in the form of
damage awards.
Clearly, the cases construing "business or property" are no string
of pearls laying down precise rules to be applied in concrete cases. The
court's application of a restrictive rule in Hawaii can, of course, be sup-
ported by prior cases decided on different facts. Perhaps the court
would have been better off to recognize the existing authority for
what it is: inapposite to a determination of whether injury to a state's
general economy constitutes injury to business or property within the
meaning of the act. The court would then have been free to decide
whether allowing Hawaii to bring an action to protect itself against
damage to its general economy would be consistent with the aims and
objectives of the antitrust laws. This would seemingly be more suitable
than to rely upon existing authority of dubious relevance.
The Supreme Court's Treatment of Judicial
Limitations on the Scope of Section 4
In determining what constitutes injury to business or property
within section 4 of the Clayton Act, the courts have repeatedly con-
strued the statute narrowly, thereby superimposing judicial restrictions
upon the language of the act. 83 Although the Supreme Court has not
yet dealt with the "business or property" issue, there is language in a
number of recent cases which casts serious doubt upon the propriety of
any judicially created restrictions upon the broad language of the Clay-
ton Act.
In Radovich v. National Football League, 4 for example, the
Supreme Court held that professional football is a form of "commerce"
and is therefore not outside the coverage of the Sherman Act. Rado-
vich specifically limited the rule of Federal Baseball Club v. Na-
82. Id. at 634.
83. See cases cited notes 69-72 supra.
84. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
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tional League85 and Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,8" which
had excluded professional baseball from the purview of the antitrust
laws. In upholding the sufficiency of the complaint, the Court pointed
out that
Congress itself has placed the private antitrust litigant in a most
favorable position through the enactment of § 5 of the Clayton Act.
... In the face of such a policy this Court should not add
requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifi-
cally set forth by Congress in those laws.87
In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,88 the plaintiff, an
owner of a small retail store, brought an action under section 4 alleging
that ten national manufacturers and distributors of household appli-
ances conspired with a chain of department stores either not to sell to
the plaintiff or to sell only at discriminatory prices. Defendants moved
for a summary judgment and produced supporting affidavits showing
that hundreds of other retail stores were selling the same appliances in
the community. Consequently, the defendants argued, plaintiff's "pri-
vate quarrel" was not a "public wrong' proscribed by the Sherman Act.
The district court granted the motion, and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that "Con-
gress [has] determined its own criteria of public harm and it [is] not
for the courts to decide whether in an individual case [public] injury
[has] actually occurred."8" Thus the Supreme Court struck down
another judicial limitation on section 4-the so-called "public injury
doctrine."
Radovich and Kors both reinforce the point that the Supreme
Court does not favor judicial limitations upon the private antitrust
plaintiff's remedies under section 4 of the Clayton Act. Therefore, if
the Supreme Court were today faced with interpreting what consti-
tutes business or property within the meaning of the act, it is open to
question whether they would adhere to some of the unnecessarily re-
strictive constructions the lower federal courts have placed upon it.
Damages
It is obvious that proving the nature and extent of the damages
to its general economy will impose upon the State of Hawaii a heavy
85. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
86. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
87. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957). Section 5
of the Clayton Act provides that a final judgment or decree in proceedings brought by
the United States establishing that a defendant has violated the act shall be prima facie
evidence against such defendant in a proceeding brought by another party against
such defendant. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1964).
88. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
89. Id. at 211.
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burden. Although the Ninth Circuit professed not to have reached
this issue, its rather cursory handling of the case suggests that skepti-
cism as to Hawaii's ability to prove the alleged damages may well
have been an unarticulated factor in its decision. While it is true that
damages must be proved and that there is no presumption as to their
amount,90 it must be kept in mind that the Hawaii case involves an in-
terlocutory appeal upon a pre-trial order on a motion to dismiss. The
case is still at the pleading stage.
At one time the courts though that the highly speculative nature
of the damages in antitrust actions, the concomitant difficulties of proof
and the characteristically long and costly trials required that special
pleading rules be applied in antitrust cases. Greater detail was thought
to be required in pleading "facts" than Rule 8(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure would normally require."' Later cases dis-
pensed with any such dichotomy in the pleading rules.9" Today
federal courts apply the same liberal "notice" pleading rules to anti-
trust cases as are applied in all other cases. In Radovich v. National
Football League,9' 3 for instance, the Supreme Court reversed an order
of dismissal for failure to state a claim, saying:
Likewise, we find the technical objections to the pleading with-
out merit. The test as to sufficiency laid down by Mr. Justice
Holmes in Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, . . . is whether "the
claim is wholly frivolous." 94
Whatever doubts one may have concerning the provability of Hawaii's
alleged damage to its economy, it can hardly be said that such allega-
tions are "wholly frivolous," or that as a mater of law they are en-
tirely without merit.
"For purposes of the [motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim]
the well-pleaded material allegations of the complaint are taken as ad-
mitted."95 Therefore, to dismiss the entire count of the complaint be-
cause damage to the general economy of a state is not readily suscepti-
ble to proof is inconsistent with the modem rules of pleading. If
plaintiff's allegations of damage are too vague, the defendants' remedy
90. Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1960); cf. Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1957).
91. Bader v. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co., 12 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1952);
Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1943).
92. E.g., New Home Appliance Center, Inc. v. Thompson, 250 F.2d 881 (10th
Cir. 1957); Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957); Louisiana Farmers
Protective Union, Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. of America, 131 F.2d 419 (8th Cir.
1942).
93. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
94. Id. at 453.
95. 2A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.08 (2d ed. 1968).
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is to make either a motion for a more definite statement,9 6 or a motion
for summary judgment,97 thereby compelling the plaintiff to support
his allegations with detailed affidavits.
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit held in Hawaii that a state cannot maintain an
action for damages to its general economy under section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act. The decision rests on two grounds: First, that the state
lacks standing to sue, and second, that damage to a state's general econ-
omy is not injury to its business or property within the meaning of the
act. Such a narrow construction of section 4 of the act is in effect
a judicial limitation on the scope of that section-a limitation sup-
ported neither by the express language of section 4, nor by the legis-
lative purpose of the antitrust laws nor by prior decisions of the Su-
preme Court. The Ninth Circuit's narrow construction of the sec-
tion was based solely on cases whose fact situations were totally un-
related to that in Hawaii.
The Hawaii case fails in its appraisal of the problem. Rigidly
interpreting the Clayton Act and sustaining existing authority by ap-
plying it to the facts of the Hawaii case, the Ninth Circuit avoids the
critical policy questions involved in the case. As states continue to
press theories of public compensation upon the courts, it is urged that
these arguments be more carefully considered in the future. Perhaps
now is the time to allow greater freedom to states to protect the health,
comfort or economic well-being of their citizens.
Darrel Knudtson*
96. F.D. R. Civ. P. 12.
97. Id. 56(b).
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